WASHINGTON — In early 2020, members of a Taliban-linked prison community in Afghanistan detained in raids advised interrogators that they’d heard that Russians have been providing cash to reward killings of American and coalition troops.

The declare, that Russia was making an attempt to pay to generate extra frequent assaults on Western forces, was beautiful, notably as a result of the US was making an attempt on the similar time to barter a cope with the Taliban to finish the long-running struggle in Afghanistan. C.I.A. analysts got down to see whether or not they may corroborate or debunk the detainees’ accounts.

In the end, newly declassified info exhibits, these analysts found a big motive to consider the declare was correct: Different members of the identical Taliban-linked community had been working intently with operatives from a notorious unit of the G.R.U., the Russian navy intelligence service, recognized for assassination operations.

“The involvement of this G.R.U. unit is in keeping with Russia encouraging assaults towards U.S. and coalition personnel in Afghanistan given its main position in such deadly and destabilizing operations overseas,” the Nationwide Safety Council stated in a press release offered to The New York Instances.

The assertion was initially drafted and declassified to function speaking factors for officers to make use of in briefing reporters final month about U.S. sanctions and other punishments towards Russia. The White Home took diplomatic motion — delivering a warning and demanding a proof for suspicious actions — concerning the bounty subject, however didn’t base sanctions on it. The Biden administration did impose sanctions for Russia’s SolarWinds hacking and election interference.

In briefing reporters, a senior administration official famous that the intelligence neighborhood had assessed with “low to average confidence” that Russia had supplied bounties. The official, specializing in different complicated points, disregarded many of the newly declassified info that had been ready to clarify what the federal government knew concerning the bounty subject.

Afterward, some commentators handled the naked line about confidence ranges as a brand new growth that amounted to the federal government strolling again its suspicions from 2020. However The Times had reported last summer that totally different intelligence businesses, whereas agreeing on the evaluation itself, disagreed on whether or not to place medium or decrease confidence in it. The proof out there to analysts — each alarming info and irritating gaps — basically stays the identical.

The discharge of the complete speaking factors as a press release is the federal government’s most detailed public rationalization but about how the C.I.A. got here to the judgment that Russia had probably supplied monetary incentives to reward assaults on American and allied troops. It additionally sheds new mild on the gaps within the proof that raised larger considerations amongst different analysts.

On this planet of intelligence evaluation, average confidence means the judgment was based mostly on info deemed to be credibly sourced and believable. Low confidence flags vital considerations concerning the high quality of the sourcing underlying a judgment.

Within the case of the bounty intelligence, officers have stated the surveillance-focused Nationwide Safety Company extra sharply discounted its confidence within the evaluation — to “low” — due to a key hole. It had not intercepted any smoking-gun electronic communication a couple of bounty plot. (The Protection Intelligence Company shares that view, whereas the Nationwide Counterterrorism Heart agrees with the C.I.A.’s “average” degree, officers have stated.)

However the assertion reveals that regardless of that disagreement over the best way to fee the standard of accessible info underlying the core evaluation, the intelligence neighborhood additionally had “excessive confidence” — that means the judgment relies on high-quality info from a number of sources — in the important thing circumstantial proof: Robust ties existed between Russian operatives and the Afghan community the place the bounty claims arose.

“We have now independently verified the ties of a number of people on this community to Russia,” the Nationwide Safety Council assertion stated. It added, “A number of sources have confirmed that components of this prison community labored for Russian intelligence for over a decade and traveled to Moscow in April 2019.”

The declassified assertion additionally opened a window into American officers’ understanding of the Russian operatives, often known as Unit 29155 of the G.R.U. The federal government has beforehand resisted speaking brazenly about group, though a Times investigation in 2019 linked it to varied operations, citing Western safety officers who spoke on the situation of anonymity.

In contrast, the Nationwide Safety Council assertion recognized different “nefarious operations” world wide that the federal government thought the squad had carried out — to clarify why the invention of its involvement with the Afghan community was seen as bolstering the credibility of the detainees’ claims about Russian bounties.

“We have now a robust physique of proof of the actions of this G.R.U. unit,” the assertion stated, accusing it of “a plot to violently disrupt Montenegro’s legislative election in 2016,” of the 2018 poisoning of a former G.R.U. officer, Sergei V. Skripal, in Salisbury, England, and of “assassinations throughout Europe.”

The American authorities’s choice to declassify intelligence about Unit 29155 for public dialogue got here as two European nations publicly raised suspicions just lately that the unit was accountable for sabotage operations on their soil.

In mid-April, the prime minister of the Czech Republic stated there was “clear proof,” assembled by intelligence and safety companies there, establishing “cheap suspicion” that Unit 29155 was involved in two explosions at ammunition depots that killed two Czechs in 2014. He stated the federal government would expel practically 80 Russian diplomats.

Days later, the prosecutor normal’s workplace in Bulgaria introduced that it was investigating a possible connection between Unit 29155 and four explosions at ammunition depots over the previous decade. Not less than two occurred whereas members of the unit have been continuously touring out and in of Bulgaria, the workplace stated.

A number of the destroyed arms in each nations, in line with officers, belonged to Emilian Gebrev, a Bulgarian arms producer who was poisoned in 2015 alongside together with his son and an govt in his firm. Officers have previously accused Unit 29155 in that tried assassination.

Whereas most earlier experiences about Unit 29155’s actions have centered in Europe, its chief, Maj. Gen. Andrei V. Averyanov, has expertise in Central Asia. He graduated in 1988 from the Tashkent Navy Academy in what was then the Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, a 12 months earlier than the Soviet pullout from bordering Afghanistan.

The federal government apparently didn’t declassify all the pieces. The White Home assertion described however didn’t element sure proof, maintaining its sources and strategies of information-gathering secret. It didn’t specify the G.R.U. unit’s quantity, however officers have stated it was Unit 29155, and the 2 prior operations the assertion talked about have been attributed to it elsewhere.

The White Home additionally didn’t establish the members of the Afghan community it accused of direct interactions with Unit 29155. Three officers have beforehand named them as Rahmatullah Azizi, a onetime drug smuggler who grew rich as a middleman for the Russian spies, and Habib Muradi. Each escaped seize and are stated to have fled to Russia.

And it made no point out of different circumstantial proof officers have beforehand described, like the invention that money was transferred from a G.R.U. account to the Afghan community.

In an interview revealed April 30 in a Russian newspaper, Nikolai Patrushev, the chairman of Russia’s Safety Council, once more stated it was false that Russia had covertly supplied bounties for killing American troops in Afghanistan, including that there was no proof that it had finished so.

The White Home assertion additionally introduced into sharper focus two gaps within the out there proof that analysts noticed as a motive to be cautious.

Navy leaders have repeatedly pointed to 1 in public: The intelligence neighborhood lacks proof tying any particular assault to a bounty fee. “We can not verify that the operation resulted in any assaults on U.S. or coalition forces,” the Nationwide Safety Council stated.

The opposite motive for warning is an absence of knowledge exhibiting {that a} Kremlin chief licensed Unit 29155 to supply bounties to Afghan militants. “We don’t have proof that the Kremlin directed this operation,” the assertion stated.

The Biden administration’s briefing to reporters final month reignited a debate over the political implications of the C.I.A.’s evaluation — and the Trump White Home’s dealing with of it — that unfolded final 12 months and dwelled partially on confidence ranges.

The Instances reported last June on the existence of the C.I.A. evaluation and that the White Home had led an interagency effort to provide you with choices to reply however then licensed none.

Going through bipartisan criticism, the Trump administration defended its inaction by taking part in down the evaluation as too weak to take severely, falsely denying that it had been briefed to President Donald J. Trump. Actually, it had been included in his written presidential day by day briefing in late February, two officers have said.

In congressional testimony, navy leaders based mostly in the US who commonly interacted with the Trump White Home stated they’d be outraged if it have been true, however they’d not seen proof that any assault resulted from bounties. However some navy officers based mostly in Afghanistan, in addition to another senior Pentagon and State Division officers, thought the C.I.A. was proper, in line with officers acquainted with inside deliberations on the time.

Amongst those that discovered the proof and evaluation persuasive was Nathan Gross sales, the State Division’s politically appointed high counterterrorism official through the Trump administration.

“The reporting that Russia was inserting bounties on American troopers’ heads was so critical that it warranted a sturdy diplomatic response,” Mr. Gross sales stated this week in an e-mail.

A high Pentagon official and the secretary of state on the time, Mike Pompeo, later delivered warnings over the issue to their Russian counterparts, successfully breaking with the White Home.

After the briefing final month, some Trump supporters — in addition to some left-wing critics of the C.I.A. and navy interventions — argued that the C.I.A.’s bounty evaluation had been debunked as evidence-free “faux information,” vindicating Mr. Trump’s dismissal of the difficulty final 12 months as a “hoax.” Russian propaganda retailers echoed and amplified these assertions.

Michael J. Morell, a former performing director of the C.I.A., stated one other issue had fostered confusion. When analysts assess one thing with low confidence, he stated, that doesn’t imply they suppose the conclusion is fallacious. Fairly, they’re expressing larger considerations concerning the sourcing limitations, whereas nonetheless judging that the evaluation is one of the best rationalization of the out there info.

“A judgment at any confidence degree is a judgment that the analysts consider to be true,” he stated. “Even when you have got a judgment that’s low confidence, the analysts consider that judgment is right. So on this case, the analysts consider that the Russians have been providing bounties.”

Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt reported from Washington, and Michael Schwirtz from New York. Julian E. Barnes contributed reporting from Washington.